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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and information concerning the development and improvement2of 
the professional environment at NPS and within the U. S. N~~. 
OFFICERS, FACULTY, STAFF and WIVES 
are invited to contribute articles 
of interest to the BAROMETER 
c/o The Editor. 
GUEST QUOTATION "Women Win on Grasp" 
-n ::, 
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Since 1922, the Johnson O'Connor Company of Boston has administered aptitude tests 
to 330,000 persons who wondered what careers they should pursue. The test results are 
an almost bottomless pit of unsorted data, and psychologist Jon J. Durkin has been 
sorting it. 
One early finding reported by the company is that women are more likely than men 
(by a factor of three to two) to have the ability to grasp ideas and theories. This 
trait is the touchstone of the successful executive, the company says, and the fact 
that men outnumber women at the top echelons of big business connot be ascribed to 
inherent ability. 
Another finding is that men outnumber women by a factor of two to one in the ability 
furthree-dimensional visualization. The company believes that this characteristic is 
important in the physical sciences, medicine, architecture, city planning, and engineering. 
Yet women's presence in these professions is even below what their lesser aptitudes 
would indicate. 
Copies of studies based on the aptitude data are available free from the Human 
Engineering Laboratory, 347 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02116. 
(Reprinted from Psychology Today Magazine, December 1971). 
FEATURE QUOTATION "The Art of Command" 
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U. S. Navy (Ret.) 
There have been tremendous physical changes in the world in the last 30 years, but 
there have been even greater changes in the social structure, in the attitudes of our 
people. This change in attitudes is going to have a much greater impact on the future 
of our country than all the advances we have made in the physical sciences. 
Undeniably. the military as a part of the greater national society necessarily 
reflects the values and the attitudes of the whole. The great social forces at work in 
our society today are creating new problems with which the military must contend. 
Nevertheless, there are some fundamentals of command that remain true, and it is time 
that the military took a good solid look at them again - as well as the consequences if 
these fundamentals are ignored. 
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There are many factors that influence the outcome of a campaign or a battle. but none 
of the factors is more important than the exercise of proper command. Every man in the 
military services spends his whole time in the service seeking to improve his role in 
the command system. both by being ready to carry out in an effective manner all orders 
he may receive and by being capable and willing to give orders to his unit to further 
the operation his outfit is undertaking. 
Important to the exercise of proper command are the systems used. The ser,dces 
continue to try to improve their systems even though sometimes the changes introduced do 
not work as well as the system did before the changes were made. The organization of 
the services is based on the necessity for a clear-cut. effective command systE:m - and 
by this I do not mean a management system. 
As important as the organization and command system is to the success of a unit. 
however. it is not nearly as important as the attitude of the people in the system. In 
every organization. from a church to a combat unit. the attitude of the members of the 
:ganization will be the determining factor in the success of the organization. A 
"gung-ho" outfit will be effective when a better equipped. sluggish. or contentious 
outfit will fail. The exercise of proper command is just as essential for noncommissioned 
and petty officers as it is for general and flag officers. As a matter of fact. it is more 
important for the lower echelons. for no matter how good the high command is, the 
organization cannot succeed unless the lower echelons have the loyalty. willingness, and 
skill to carry out their orders in the proper fashion. 
All people in a military organization must understand the necessity of command and 
discipline if that organization is to be successful. Seamen and soldiers. more than any 
other group. must understand this. When there is no command. no discipline. there is no 
military organization. There is no place in a military organization for disobedience, 
and if disobedience is permitted for whatever reason, the organization rapidly deteriorates 
to an uncontrollable mob. Unfortunately we have heard of such cases in our own services 
over the last few years. If this pattern continues, the ultimate result is predictable. 
Command responsibility is not possible without command authority. A corporal must 
have the authority to exercise his command responsibilities or he cannot direct his squad 
or his unit. The chevron he wears is a mark of his authority as it is a mark of his 
responsibility. If he has been given the authority and cannot, or will not, exercise his 
responsibilities, then he must be removed and another man trained to carry out his duties. 
Of course, senior commanders. including fleet and area commanders, need authority 
too if they are to perform successfully. If the local commander on the spot must refer 
most of his problems with recommended solutions back to Washington for decision, either 
decisions will be delayed to the point where a once right solution will no longer be 
timely, and therefore wrong, or the recommended decision is modified enough so that it is 
no longer a solution. Occasionally, problems referred back to Washington for solution do 
result in timely and correct decisions, but the odds are against it. From what I have 
heard, in the last few years, senior commanders have had too little authority to make 
decisions, and quite naturally their operations have suffered. 
This is not to say that local commanders should be free of all restrictions on their 
authority. Some restrictions must be retained, but they should be formulated as more 
general policy guidelines within which the local commander must operate. If he does not, 
he should be replaced. If, instead of living by this old fashioned idea of requiring 
performance of a commander some higher authority issues orders that should be given by a 
Ubordinate, a lot of very undesirable things are apt to occur. First, the initiative of 
the subordinate commander is sapped. It is obvious his seniors do not have confidence 
in his judgment or his ability. Second, his command realizes he is no longer boss, and 
his image in their eyes suffers. Finally, senior commanders usually do not have time to 
follow through on the execution of orders carried out far away, and that always yields 
poor results. In short, the proper orders are frequently not given, and the orders that 
are given are not well executed. 
-3-
The same results occur in very small commands too. If the first class petty officer 
starts issuing directions that should be given by the third class, the third class petty 
officer loses his effectiveness and the first class is not working in his own j~ate but 
in a lower one. Such actions short circuit the chain of command - nobody knows who has 
the responsibility - and it is expensive as well. The Government is paying for two 
petty officers and utilizing only one, and in these days this amounts to squandering our 
most precious and expensive commodity - people. 
I have also heard there is a growing tendency to bypass commands. Eve~7body who has 
taken elementary training in any organization, civilian or military, should know the evil 
effects of this pernicious practice. It does not take long before the whole command 
is demoralized for the simple old reason that responsibility and authority cannot be 
separated. 
I have said enough about the necessity of investing the proper authority in all 
commands, from the lowest to the highest, if our mission is to be accomplished. Now I 
would like to bear down a little on the responsibilities of commanders, and again I 
would like to stress that these principles are as important to noncommissioned connllands as 
they are to Fleet and Army commands. 
In every organization, individuals occupying various positions have specific jobs 
to do. The assignment of duties may be by job description sheets, organization manllal!", 
or by custom, but people must know who does what if the organization is to function 
properly. Similarly, standards must be set and quality control established for every 
job. There must be some yardstick of performance. The only difference between civilian 
organizations and military organizations is that failure in a civilian organization may 
mean the ruin of a company or an industry, while failure in a military organization will 
too often result in the collapse of a nation, either immediately or more gradually. Many 
times in military operations there is only one chance to succeed or fail, and with the 
consequences of failure being what they are, military men had better be as certain as they 
can that operations undertaken are successful. 
This leads to the mos t important responsibility of every commander - th,= responsi-
bility to insure that the standards he sets for hi= unit are high eno'jgh to enable his 
unit to be successful and, as a corollary, to reward those subordinates who do extra-
ordinarily well and to punish those who fail. For years we in the military have gone all 
out in rewarding people. We have emphasized rewards so much that many times peoplf' are 
rewarded for doing an ordinary job without distinction. On the other hand, we have 
neglected to punish those who fail to measure up to high standards, even ~/hen that failure 
j s willful. Every man who has ever commanded any unit, even the most minor of small units, 
knows that he must demand proper performance, and if he does not get it he must take 
whatever action is necessary to get it. Men must either qualify for their jobs or lose 
them. Subordinates must perform. If they cannot, they must be trained. If they still 
cannot do the job, they must be fired or given a job they can perform. That part is not 
too difficult to accomplish. The hard part is what to do with men who can but do no t do 
their duty. It is a commander's obligation and not just his prerogative to punish willful 
reglect of duty. The voice of duty is a stern voice. If punishment is not inflicted 
quickly and surely on transgressions, the good men in the unit suffer from the wrong 
attitude of poor people. Nothing lowers the effectiveness of a unit faster or further 
than acceptance of disobedience or deliberate poor performance. Permissiveness has no 
virtue in a military organization. Requirements for performance should be reasonable, 
just, and fair, but an individual in the military cannot decide which requirements he 
will meet and which he will ignore nor determine under what conditions these requirements 
will be met. Reliability of performance, loyalty, and willingness to do his very best 
to further the mission of unit has been the hallmark of members of good military units 
since the dawn of history. 
As you can see, I am a traditionalist. I am convinced that the lessons of the past 
are proper guides for the future. I do not believe in fragging or in mob control. I am 
even convinced that strict discipline is a necessary ingredient in a good military unit. 
(Excerpt from lecture delivered at Naval War College, reprinted in Naval War College 
Review, July 1972). 
